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Abstract 
Internet of things has been a hot topic for some time now. The huge number of new 
devices and the limited size of these devices introduce some new problems. Recent 
event show a trend where IoT devices are being utilized more frequently in cyber-
attacks. Home automation is becoming highly attractive and more and more people 
see the benefits of connecting household objects to the internet.  This report will take 
a closer look at the cryptographic part of securing communication between IoT 
devices for smart homes as well as reviewing the architecture. A literature review will 
be performed to highlight previous work and determining the state of IoT.  Based on 
this, an analysis of different security measures will be performed to find the best 
suited solutions for ensuring integrity, confidentiality and availability. The report 
focuses on the topics of public key infrastructure, data encryption and network 
architecture, where different solutions will be discussed to propose set of security 
measures that are best suited for securing smart homes. 
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1 Introduction 
The internet as we know it is always evolving, and in recent years an enormous increase 
in number of devices connected to the internet has occurred. Now, ordinary objects like 
TVs, watches and smoke detectors are given the feature to connect to the internet. This 
is what we call the Internet of Things. Interconnection of smart objects or “things” enable 
them to collect and transmit data. With this comes a wide range of possibilities in almost 
all fields and industry. The concept of IoT marks a new chapter in the history of the 
Internet. Cars, watches, cameras and medical equipment can now communicate over the 
internet. This enables more remote controlling, automation and monitoring of regular 
objects and processes. While the technology itself might not be brand new, now is the 
time where we see it be implemented in almost any object to create a network of “things”.  
 
Connecting so many smaller devices to the internet clearly has its benefits in productivity 
and added features, but also some new problems. That fact that the devices themselves 
are so different in sizes and uses, hint to a problem we will cover later in this report, 
namely the lack of standardizations. Another problem which has been the main concern 
for many, is the lack of security. Security is costly and gives little enjoyment to the 
general end-user. It is first at the lack of security that users see the value of sufficient 
security measures. With restricted space comes limited hardware, and thus drawbacks in 
computational power. Although such devices usually do not need a lot of computational 
power to do their intended tasks, it becomes an issue when we add security measures 
like encryption and digital signing [1].  
 
Although there certainly are a lot of IoT devices that are adequately secured, there are 
still many aspects where there is need for improvements. This is not only a problem for 
those who chooses to use such devices, but can also affect the general users of the 
internet. How severe the outcome of a compromised devices is, is highly dependent on 
the type of device, and what security measures that are implemented to handle this. 
Within the IoT field, there are multiple sub fields such as home automation, industrial 
controllers and sensors, smart healthcare and so on. Some of these contain or transmit 
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vital information, thus the importance of confidentiality is critical. This could be systems in 
E-health or the electronics in a car. Here, a compromised device or tampered data could 
have fatal outcomes. Others might not handle such important information, but the control 
of the device is still crucial to protect from hackers.  
 
As mentioned there are various fields within IoT, and within these fields, different types of 
devices. This results in a huge number of settings with different requirements and 
conditions. This means that IoT will have to handle a new spectre of security threats in 
addition to the known dangers of internet communication.  
 
In this report we will discuss some of the problems with security that arises with the IoT 
devices. Because IoT is a very vague and wide concept, it covers a lot of different 
devices which have different uses and ways of operating. This makes it difficult to find 
one solution which is best suited for all IoT devices. We will therefore take a closer look 
at home automation and security measures which can be applied to such devices. Also, 
we will evaluate how a network of such devices is best structured. The findings in this 
review will then be discussed to propose what solutions should be used. By looking at 
these topics we hope to shed some light on the need for improved security in IoT 
devices, and also propose solutions to help the work with creating common standards for 
IoT. 
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1.1 Background 
Everyday tools are augmented to be connected to the internet. Objects like smoke 
detectors, thermostats and lightbulbs can now be monitored and controlled for added 
functionality and convenience. Home automation is becoming highly attractive and more 
and more people see the benefits of connecting household objects to the internet. New 
products are constantly entering the market, providing added security, comfort and 
convenience. Common features include: monitor security camera, remote control of 
lights and appliances and energy saving.  
 
 
Figure 1 - Smart home example 
The above model shows an example of a typical IoT environment for home automation. 
Numerous sensors and controlling devices are connected to one or more applications 
over the Internet via a gateway device.  
 
Increased size is an example of something we wish to avoid, even when we are adding 
functionality. This is especially noticeable in the home-automation area, where 
convenience and aesthetics are highly valued attributes. Even though objects like smoke 
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detectors and baby monitors are given features to be remotely managed, we do not want 
them to be any bigger than before. And although we are willing to pay a little extra for 
this, the price should still be within a reasonable limit relative to a “non-smart” version. 
Due to these limitations, several problems occur with the IoT devices. Size limitations 
and cost efficiency makes for limited processing power, and manufacturers must make 
some compromises.  
 
IoT face many of the same problems as regular computers, but not all the problems can 
be solved in the same way. Many devices are built to have long lifetime and to operate 
without much human intervention after deployment. The hardware of the devices is also 
quite varying. Some of the devices are able to use the standard well-known algorithms 
for securing communications. But for devices with limited resources this might not be 
practical in terms of time and energy consumption. For this reason, some algorithms 
might be better suited than others in different situations. The problem is to know what 
algorithms will perform best under specific circumstances. 
 
With the rapid development in new devices and their way of operating, it has been a 
difficult task to keep up standard ways of implementation and communication for IoT 
devices. Also, the definition of IoT itself has been proven to be quite difficult. There are 
numerous ways of describing the concept. One definition, from IEEE, goes as follows: “A 
network of items—each embedded with sensors—which are connected to the Internet” 
[2]. As we can see here, the definition is not so specific, but it captures the essence of 
what IoT is. “Things” can be interpreted to mean basically whatever you would like it to 
mean. And also, it is used in so many different settings. With this, the term covers an 
endless number of different types of “devices”, with different uses and ways of operating. 
Together with the definition comes a three-layered model of the architecture of IoT.  
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Figure 2 - 3-layered model of IoT[3 Fig. 3] 
This shows a representation of the 3-layered model with examples of technologies and 
protocols that are used in each layer. The layers in this model are: Application layer, 
network layer and perception layer [3]. Here, the perception layer consists of the physical 
tasks of the devices, like sensing or controlling. This is also where the information is 
transformed to digital form. The network layer is responsible for transportation of the 
information between the perception layer and application layer. This layer uses protocols 
like Bluetooth, Wi-Fi and ZigBee. Application layer is what we as users see of the IoT 
process. This is where the information is presented and stored in various IoT 
applications.   
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1.2 Problem statement 
As the last years have shown, attacks that utilize insecure IoT devices are becoming a 
common trend. It is clear, that in general the security of IoT devices is not good enough. 
As the number of such devices increase, it is safe to assume that IoT will continue to be 
a target and an attack vector for years to come. The growth is not only in terms of 
number of devices, but also in terms of various types and formats. With such variety in 
use, size and available resources, standardization becomes a difficult task.  
 
More and more people are seeing the benefits that these smart objects bring, and are 
now willing to pay for it. While some smart products, like smart TVs, have been around 
for a while, more and more smart object are finding their way into the regular household.  
To handle this, home automation systems must make use of new and existing security 
measures. The system must be secure and scalable, to safely manage the increasing 
number of internet connected devices in your home. The problem is that the process of 
standardization is not keeping up with the rate of development. The result is a variety of 
solutions with different technologies, and some without sufficient security.  
 
To find and propose better solutions for the security in smart home networks, this report 
will consist of a literature review and an analysis different security measures and 
solutions for the following topics: 
- Public key infrastructure 
- Data encryption 
- Network architecture 
.  
The system needs to be scalable, and be able to handle a huge number of off- and on 
boarding of devices in a secure manner. It also needs to uphold the fundamental 
elements of AIC triad; Availability, Integrity and Confidentiality. With this we mean that 
the data and devices must be available to the user at all times. The user must also be 
sure that the data has not been tampered with and that it comes from legitimate sources. 
And all sensitive information must be handled in a way to protect the privacy of the user.   
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1.3 Security Assumptions 
Given the security flaws in many IoT devices there is need for improvement [4] [5]. With 
the vast differences in need for security for all the types of devices it is difficult to specify 
requirements that hold for all. Providing a set of security measures that fits all possible 
scenarios is therefore not practical. Limitations like computational power calls for use of 
lightweight algorithms. While these are necessary for devices with extreme hardware 
limitations, other kinds will not have any benefit of this implementation and might have 
need for a stronger solution.  
 
This chapter will describe a typical setup for a smart home and define some assumptions 
and requirements for a possible solution. The analysis of this report will assume the 
following set of devices as a baseline for the evaluation of different solutions: 
 
 
The network consists of IoT devices that are sold commercially and are popular among 
those who wish to implement home automation elements. The devices in this model are 
a smoke detector, a smart watch, an alarm system and a thermostat, are devices that 
represents IoT devices with minor limitations in hardware. The hardware capabilities of 
Internet 
 
Figure 3 - Assumed model of smart home 
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such devises are comparable to the capabilities of other commonly used IoT devices for 
smart homes and are therefore a good representative selection for the field. In this setup, 
the devices are connected to the Internet via the home router. The user can connect to, 
and manage the devices with applications from his mobile phone.  
 
To maintain a secure communication between the nodes, encryption is a must. 
Cryptographic keys must then be safely transferred between the parties to enable 
encryption and decryption. How the data is encrypted is also important to look at. The 
algorithm must not be so heavy that a device with limited computational power cannot 
run it. And it must also have a sufficient level of security to ensure confidentiality for the 
users.  The structure of the communication itself is also necessary to review. The 
network needs to be structured in a way that supports a massive increase of number of 
devices, and it needs a secure way of discovering and managing devices.  
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1.4 Literature review 
IoT is a field that has gained increasing momentum in the later years. With the 
components becoming cheaper, IoT devices for home automation are becoming more 
and more popular. Consequently, there is a lot of research being done in the field.  In this 
report we will look at some of the trends in IoT and what direction things are going. IoT is 
a concept that with different definition and descriptions depending on who you ask. 
Because of this, it is natural that there are different opinions on what solutions are the 
best.  
 
With a wide variety of communication technologies in use with IoT. Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, 
ZigBee and GSM/3G/4G all have their benefits in specific use-cases. But this becomes a 
problem when maintaining a network of different devices. Routers and gateways solve 
the problem with protocol translation, but this makes the communication path more 
complex than it needs to be. And more middleware operations enable more possible 
exploits along the path. To solve this, we are moving towards all-IP based networks with 
IPv6 and 5G.  
 
There have been developed protocols that try to standardize communication on the 
network layer to provide end-to-end IP connection. IPv6 over Low-Power Wireless 
Personal Area Networks (6LoWPANs), IPv6 Routing Protocol for Low-Power and Lossy 
Networks (RPL), are two standards being developed and maintained by IETF [6] [7]. 
These standards aim to enable the use of IPv6 over Low power and Lossy 
Networks(LLN) such as IEEE 802.15.4.  
 
A report from McAfee predicts that IoT will become an important target for cyber 
criminals in the near future [8]. What types of attacks and how cyber criminals will make 
money on it is still unclear. There are numerous vulnerabilities and exploits related to IoT 
in general.  But hackers must be able to perform them on a large scale to be able to 
make profit of it. 
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Last year, the number ransomware attacks and ransomware families had a massive 
increase. While this was mainly focused on regular computers analysts believe it will 
migrate to IoT soon. This has proven to be an easy way for hackers to make money, and 
given the sheer numbers and possible exploits it is reasonable to assume that we will 
see much more of this targeted to IoT devices.   
  
The report also predicts that IoT also will be a target for hacktivist. Controlling and sensor 
devices for critical infrastructure and manufacturing systems in bigger companies could 
be a major target for political and environmental activists who are willing to use more 
extreme means to accomplish their goal. This could be an even more serious threat than 
cyber criminals as criminals want to make money on their actions and are thus usually 
not so destructive. Activist who go as far as to use criminal acts to help their cause, could 
be much more dangerous. Disrupting a voting poll or a security sensor in critical 
infrastructure could have catastrophic effects. 
  
Rather than targeting single devices, new attacks will likely emerge that target a higher 
plane in the IoT network infrastructure. Targeting IoT devices by themselves will in most 
cases not be very profitable for attackers. By targeting the gateways and data collectors 
instead, attackers could gain control of huge amount of data or devices at once. We will 
likely also see a development in these types of devices to enable monitoring of IoT 
devices themselves for security reasons. IDS and behavioral monitoring will be a way to 
enable security measures for devices that have limited hardware resource. 
  
Another topic, which is one of the reasons why there is so many security flaws tied to 
IoT. More and more products are being IP-enabled, meaning they can connect to the 
internet. Manufacturers with no prior experience with internet connected devices, are 
now starting to develop products that are going to be exposed to the internet. This will 
result in some of them making mistakes that more experienced companies would not do. 
  
As consumers realize that more and more of the data they are creating is used by 
various vendors, privacy protection will become more desired by consumers. One way to 
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ensure user privacy is to make use of the blockchain technology. The Blockchain 
technology has previously been used in the cryptocurrency Bitcoin with great success, 
and uses a peer-to-peer model rather than the classic server-client infrastructure. This 
technology will still provide the vendors with valuable data, but it will not be identifiable to 
a user or device to protect the privacy of the consumer. 
 
Another report of predictions of the threat picture for the years to come by Fortinet [9]. In 
this report they expect the botnets like Mirai to grow and become more sophisticated.  It 
is speculated that the attacks we saw in the later part of 2016 could just be a test to see 
the abilities of an IoT powered botnet. Now that the capabilities are demonstrated we will 
see these botnets being used in more advanced attacks. 
  
The previous report by McAfee suggested a that inexperience of manufacturers in 
internet communication could be a reason for the many security flaws related to IoT. This 
report highlights the same issue, but also points to another impact of the problem. 
Manufacturers outsource the development of the components that are responsible for the 
network communication to other technology companies. An example of this could be a 
company that produces smoke detectors. Since smoke detectors previously had no need 
to be connected to the internet, such a company will have little to no experience in 
securing the hardware and communication of the product. This is then outsourced to a 
company which has experience such devices. The problem is when multiple vendors 
have multiple product using components from the same company. If vulnerabilities are 
found in the components from that company, it will affect a huge number of devices. 
 
Another organization that has done some valuable work in this field is The Open Web 
Application Security Project (OWASP). The OWASP Internet of Things Project works to 
provide information about security related topics regarding IoT [10]. The project offers 
information about vulnerabilities, attack surfaces, as well as general guidelines for 
improving security when deploying IoT devices.  
 
Christer Eriksen Hole Analysis of security for IoT 
 
 
1.0 
 
 
 
Page 19 of 69 
 
A report on smart home systems proposes an approach on how to implement better 
security in home automation with internet of things [11]. The system is based on a 
centralized model where the nodes are connected and managed via a home gateway. 
The devices are connected to the gateway over Wi-Fi. The base of this implementation is 
the framework called AllJoyn [12]. The framework enables development of apps for easy 
management and security for IoT.  
 
Streembit is another approach to the same problem [13]. With this solution, the 
developers also want to provide security for IoT networks, but use a different approach 
with the architectural structure. Nodes in the system are connected in a decentralized 
peer-to-peer network. The developers view this model as the best suited to handle IoT 
devices because of the scalability, easy on-boarding and security it delivers.  
 
1.4.1 Vulnerabilites  
While the new devices come with endless uses and improvements to industries and at 
home, there are also a lot of challenges that occur. Compromises have to be made to 
make them both functional and sufficiently secure. Internet of things devices and 
communication is susceptible to many of the same vulnerabilities as regular computers 
and networks are. Here we will list some of the major threats that IoT devices and 
networks face. The threats will be divided into 3 sections derived from the 3-layered 
model of IoT architecture proposed by IEEE [2]. Physical threats include vulnerabilities 
and attacks that target the physical part of the devices or the device’s firmware i.e. 
correlated to the perception layer. The threats under the network section will be similar to 
many of the attack vectors we already see on the internet as many IoT devices utilize the 
same protocol and means of communication as regular computers. The network layer 
handles the transmitting of data between the devices. This is also the main focus area of 
this report. The last section contains threats related to the applications and middleware 
that is used in relation with IoT. These attacks target application that are controlling, 
monitoring and presenting data from end-nodes.  
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Physical 
- Tampering of the physical device itself. This could be removing parts of the 
devices, like SD-cards or removing the whole devices. Devices with physical 
interfaces could also be accessed by attackers. Keeping devices hidden or locked 
away will prevent unauthorized access in such ways.  
 
- Outdated firmware is been shown to be a major problem with routers and other 
IoT devices [14]. Despite the solution being both easy and obvious. Simply update 
the devices regularly. A study from Ubuntu [15] surveying 2000 users, shows that 
an alarming amount of user don’t apply updates as they are released, or even 
make use of automatic updating. In some cases, the users believe the 
responsibility to be either the manufacturer or software developer or just don’t do it 
out of simple laziness. But with IoT, firmware updates can be tricky. Many of the 
devices are deployed with the expectation that they would operate for long periods 
of time with human interactions. Failure to apply critical updates can result in 
hackers exploiting known issues that could have been patched. Last year 
thousands of router running outdated firmware were infected by a worm that 
exploited an old vulnerability [16].  
 
- Differential power analysis is a type of side-channel attack. An attacker analyses 
the power consumption of the device over time. The power trace can then be 
analysed to find patterns for computing values during the steps of for example an 
encryption algorithm. This can then be used further to find cryptographic keys. 
This kind of attack requires the attacker to have physical access to the devices.  
 
- Pre-computed cryptographic keys are quite common in IoT devices [14]. These 
keys are implemented in the firmware of the devices before shipping. The purpose 
of these keys is to work as a seed in other cryptographic algorithms. The problem, 
however, is that a lot of these keys are the same or not random enough. This 
results in an attacker being able to guess or even know what cryptographic key a 
device is using.  
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Network 
- A lot of IoT devices transmit data even without any security measures to protect 
the communication.  
 
- Man in the Middle Attack (MITM). In a man in the middle attack, the attacker 
intercepts communication between two entities in a communication network. If 
performed well, neither of the parties will be aware that the communication is 
transferred between them via a third party. A typical example of a MITM attack is 
when an attacker intercepts the communication between a client and a server. 
The attacker pretends to be the server that the client is trying to connect to. There 
are various methods to do this, like ARP Poisoning or Sybil attack. The client then 
sends the request to the attacker which forwards it to the server. The response 
from the server is then forwarded the same way in the other direction. This allows 
the attacker to not only see, but also make changes in the data which is 
transferred. The best way of protecting against MITM attacks is digital certificates. 
Digital certificates let devices identify themselves to ensure that the other end of 
the communication is legitimate.  
 
- Sybil attacks are performed by use of fake identities or devices in a network. One 
or more malicious nodes acts as multiple nodes, to influence, control or spy on 
other legitimate nodes [17].  
 
 
- DDOS This is not a weakness like the others listed here. The vulnerability here is 
not a single device being targeted by such an attack. The danger is that using 
exploits and weaknesses like the ones that are mentioned here, attackers could 
infect thousands of devices to perform massive DDoS attacks. Recent events 
have shown that IoT devices can be used to execute powerful DDoS-attacks. The 
attackers make use of botnets, which are networks of devices that are infected 
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with a small malicious software. These infected devices usually stay dormant until 
it receives commands from a command and control centre (C&C). The malicious 
code is small, hidden and therefore difficult to detect, aside from the 
communication to the C&C. In 2016 the Mirai botnet was the primary actor in two 
record breaking DDoS attacks. The first attack happened in September, targeting 
krebsonsecurity.com, a security blog by Brian Krebs [18]. The second attack 
targeted the infrastructure of DNS provider Dyn in October the same year [19]. 
This one lead to services from companies like Amazon, Spotify and many others 
being unavailable for several hours. The infection method of the Mirai botnet is to 
scan the internet of connected devices. A database of default usernames and 
passwords is then used to attempt to gain access to the scanned devices. Many 
such devices still use the default username and password combination from the 
manufacturer, making it easy for the attacker to gain access. This just shows that 
even though it might not seem like the device need a high level of security at first 
glance, it is crucial to hinder unwanted access to them to avoid attacks like these.  
 
- Exposing a device to the internet enables you to access and control it remotely. 
While this is a major benefit it can also be used against you.  
 
 
Application 
While this report is mainly focused on the network layer of IoT, all aspects has to be 
worked on to provide sufficient level of security. An analysis of a newer, programmable 
smart home application highlights weaknesses in the application layer of IoT [20]. 
Multiple design flaws in applications for smart homes were uncovered, and then used to 
perform attacks to retrieve pin codes for locks, disable vacation mode and raise false 
alarm in smart home security systems. Some of the vulnerabilities found included 
Overpriviligation. Overprivileged default users seems to be a common problem with IoT 
devices. Because of the SmartThings framework, which was used in this case, 
applications can get more capabilities than they require. An example showed that an 
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auto-lock application which required the ability to lock the devices, also automatically 
obtained the ability to unlock it, even if it didn’t use it.  
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1.4.2 Obstacles 
There are many known vulnerabilities related to internet of things. Some of them have 
solutions that could be used with a regular computer network. With IoT, there are some 
limitation in the fundamental way the devices work that makes it difficult to handle them. 
While a lot of the vulnerabilities mentioned earlier can be fixed by more security focused 
development, these obstacles are the things that make implementing IoT in a secure 
manner difficult. To further develop IoT for the future, security solutions must take this 
into account and find ways to handle them. 
 
1.4.2.1 Size 
Size poses a challenge in the design of IoT devices. In all areas there are devices which 
has a need to be as small as possible. This leaves little room for components, and as a 
result, devices have limitations in how fast they are and how much storage they have. 
Manufacturer must then choose wether or not they want to use more expensive, size-
efficient hardware. Depending of the type of devices, this can drive the price up to levels 
above what the consumer regards as a reasonable price. A lot of the devices released in 
todays market only have hardware that is sufficent to perform their primary tasks. 
 
1.4.2.2 Key Handling  
Public key infrastructure is a set of actions and policies that enable distribution and 
storage of cryptographic keys. These are used for encryption and identification of 
devices to ensure secure communcation over a network. Cryptographic keys in public 
key infrastructures are asymmetric. This means that each part in the communcation has 
its own key as opposed to symmetric algorithms where both encryption and decryption 
key is the same. Operations are performed by use of a combination of private and public 
keys. To make use of symmetric algorithms, the involved nodes have to agree on a 
common secret key to handle decryption and encryption. To make sure that no third 
party actor is able to access this key, the agreement has to be done in a secure manner. 
Because communication channels like WiFi are succeptable to traffic sniffing,  methods 
like RSA or Diffie-Hellman should be used. Failure to do so can result in attackers being 
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able to view encrypted data and also digitally sign transmission to act as a legitimate 
sender. This can be difficult in environments with limited computational power as shown 
above.  
 
Handling of asymmetric cryptographic keys is very important but these keys are often 
very large. Use of heavy algorithms such as RSA for key exchange, digital signing and 
trust certificates will then become too slow and impractical to use [48].  
 
1.4.2.3 Need for security 
The need for security is not the same in all devices. Some devices process sensitive 
data and have a strong need for confidentiality. Data which identifies the user or 
information like pins for security systems must be encrypted to protect the user. Others 
devices, that control appliences in your home, are dependent on correct information from 
sensors. These devices will then have a high need for integrety to ensure that the data is 
correct.  A coffee machine which can be controlled over the internet might not directly 
have a high need of security as it does not process any important data or control critical 
parts of you home. But in the case that someone gains access to this devices it could be 
used further as a spring board to launch an attack on the rest of your network. 
 
 
1.4.2.4 Battery powered devices 
With smaller and sometimes portable devices, it is quite common for them to be battery 
powered. While the power provided by the battery may be sufficent to do its intended 
task, computing keys and encrypting data can sometimes draw too much power. Many 
IoT devices are deployed with the intention that they operate for longer periods of time 
without much human interaction. If the security measures are too demanding in terms of 
power usage, the battery will run empty more frequently and make the device impractical 
to use.  
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1.4.2.5 Scalability 
This obstacle occurs when joining more “things” together. As we are seeing an increase 
in the number of devices, it is important to have a system that is able to handle frequent 
off- and onboarding of devices. For the home automation field, a user must be able to 
easily connect and disconnect his devices without needing to upgrade infrastructure 
devices. 
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1.5 Problem solution 
Finding the optimal solutions for securing smart homes requires a knowledge of the state 
of IoT. A literature study has been done to review the current situation on some aspects 
of security for IoT, and look at some new solutions that are being developed.  
 
Based the problem statement and security assumptions, this report will solve the 
problem by answering the following questions: 
 
- Is Elliptic Curve Cryptography more suitable for smart home devices than RSA?  
- Should the ultra-lightweight encryption algorithm PRESENT replace AES in such 
a setting? 
- Which type of network architecture is best suited for the future of IoT? Centralized 
client-server, or decentralized peer-to-peer? 
 
At first, the different solutions will be described to highlight their properties and how they 
work. The solutions in each of the topics will then be compared to each other to analyse 
their strengths and weaknesses. The findings will be discussed, to answer the questions 
above and with regards to the use-case. 
 
The final result will be a proposal of a set of solutions that secures the communication in 
home automation and ensures availability, integrity and confidentiality. The choices 
should be made by considering both the current state of smart home devices, as well as 
envisions of the future of IoT. 
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1.6 Report outline 
The rest of the report will be structured as follows. Chapter 2 contains Theoretical 
background where topics that will be analysed further in the report will be explained. 
Section 3 will be about differentiating the possible solutions. What are their pros and 
cons, and when are they most beneficial to use. This knowledge will then be used to 
compare them to each other. Findings from the comparison will be used in a discussion 
in section 4 which will lead to the conclusion of the report in section 5. At the end, 
chapter 6 will suggest possible further work that builds on the discussed topics in this 
report. 
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2 Theoretical background 
As a technology, IoT is not really something new. Sensor networks and Machine-to-
machine communication has been around for years. In recent years, the concept has 
become more wide-spread as the number of devices increases. The number of devices 
connected to the internet is expected to grow exponentially towards 50 billion devices by 
2020. Additionally it is expected to reach 20 billion by the end of 2017 [21]. This will 
result in an average of around 6 devices per person worldwide.  
 
This chapter will highlight the different solutions that will be reviewed later in the report. 
Some of them are the currently used standards in regular computer networks. These 
have shown to be highly valuable and have then been implemented for IoT purposes as 
well. The others will be solutions that serve the same purpose but may be better suited 
for use when operating with IoT devices. We see that the security of IoT poses a lot of 
challenges. Many of these can be directly tied to algorithms for encryption requiring too 
much rescourses. But adding more powerful hardware to such limited space can be 
difficult without driving the cost of the product up to an unreasonable level. Therefore, we 
should look to newer ways of doing things in terms of algorithms. Lightweight 
cryptographic algortims are already being developed and some are even in use.  
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2.1 Public key 
Asymmetric, or public key systems uses a pair of keys for each node. A public key which 
is published and a secret one that only the user knows. The key pair is derived from a 
large random number to make it difficult for an attacker to find out the values of the keys. 
Such keys have the property that a user can then encrypt data with the public key of the 
receiver, and the receiver then uses his private key to decrypt. Another usage is that the 
sender can use its private key to ensure the recipient of his identity. These actions are 
usually called encryption and digital signing respectively.  
 
The security of this algorithm is based on the problem of factoring a product of two large 
prime numbers. It is considered a hard problem and there has yet to be found a solution 
which can solve it in a reasonable time, to intercept the communication. Although it is a 
secure way to encrypt and transfer data, the algorithm is to slow to be used on all 
communication. It is usually just used to transmit keys to a symmetric algorithm like AES, 
which is then used to encrypt the data.  
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2.1.1 RSA 
RSA is an asymmetric algorithm which is widely used today for creating a secure way to 
transmit. It is one of the first public-key cryptosystems to be used. As an asymmetric 
algorithm, it uses key pairs for encryption and decryption. RSA is embedded in the 
SSL/TLS protocol which is used for secure communication. NIST recommends key sizes 
of at least 2048 bits for use before 2030 [22]. After that at least 3072 should be used. 
The currently most used key sizes are now 2048 and 4096 bits.  
 
The keys that used in RSA are generated in 5 steps [23]: 
1. Choose two large, distinct primes p and q. 
2. A value n, is calculated as a product of p and q. n = pq 
3. The totient of n, 𝜙(𝑛) = (𝑝 − 1)(𝑞 − 1), is calculated. 
4. A key, e is a chosen integer which is coprime to ϕ(n). This can be any integer in 
the range [3, ϕ(n)), but usually 65537 is chosen because it is and adequately high 
number that often fulfils the condition of being coprime to 𝜙(𝑛). 
5. The other key is then determined by finding the modular multiplicative inverse of e 
modulo 𝜙(𝑛). This is done using 𝑑 ≡  𝑒−1 (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝜙(𝑛)) 
 
The fact that encryption key e can be chosen, and often to the same number, makes it 
not random at all. While this might seem like a bad idea for a cryptographic key, it is not 
a problem. This is the public key, so it will be publicly available anyway. Also, it is not 
possible to efficiently determine the private key from the public key. This is called the 
discrete logarithm problem, and is what RSA builds it security on. To find e from d you 
need 𝜙(𝑛), and to find this you need the prime factors of n. Since n is composed of large 
primes, this is hard to find.  
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Encryption and decryption in RSA is performed by raising the message to the power of 
the keys. In other words, to create a cipher text c we perform: 
 
𝑚𝑒 (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛) = 𝑐 
Equations 1 - Encryption RSA 
 
Since d is the multiplicative inverse of e with respect to 𝜙(𝑛), we get have: 
 
𝑒 ∗ 𝑑 = 1 (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝜙(𝑛)) 
 
Because of this we can decrypt c by raising to key as such: 
 
𝑐𝑑 = (𝑚𝑒)𝑑 = 𝑚𝑒∗𝑑 = 𝑚1 ( 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝜙(𝑛)) = 𝑚 
Equations 2 - Decryption RSA 
 
As we see, decryption is done by raising the cipher text to the other key. By doing this we 
multiply the exponents which gives us the original message. Because of the operation is 
commutative we can do this both ways.  
 
𝑚𝑒∗𝑑 =  𝑚𝑑∗𝑒 
 
The first application of RSA enables the sender to encrypt a message with the recipients 
public key and the receiver to decrypt it with the private key. With the property shown 
above, RSA also has another use. If the sender decrypts with his private key, anyone 
can decrypt the message with the public key. This is used in digital signing which 
ensures the receiver that the message originated from the holder of the private key.  
 
A full proof can be found here [23]. 
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2.1.2 ECC 
Elliptic curve cryptography is one of the solutions which can replace RSA. Elliptic curve 
cryptography is performed by doing operations on an elliptic curve over finite fields. 
Studies have shown that decryption and digital signing can be done significantly faster 
with ECC than with RSA, and therefor require less computational power [48]. It is more 
favorable because it requires a smaller key size to achieve the same level of security as 
long as the parameters are chosen correctly. This means it can do the same job, but 
requires less power. This is an excellent attribute, seeing as so many of the IoT devices 
have limitations in hardware.  
 
 
The functions of elliptic curve cryptography are defined as point operations on an elliptic 
curve, y2 =  x3 +  ax +  b, where 4a3 +  27b2 ≠  0. a and b are variables, and different 
values gives different curves. Usually an elliptic curve used for cryptography would look 
something like this.  
The basic operations with the elliptic curve is point addition and point doubling. Point 
addition is done by drawing a line between the two points. The line intersects in some 
third point along the curve. The sums of these two points is the inverse of the intersection 
point. The inverse point is the reflection with respect to the x-axis.  
Figure 4 - Elliptic curve [21] 
Christer Eriksen Hole Analysis of security for IoT 
 
 
1.0 
 
 
 
Page 34 of 69 
 
 
Figure 5 - Point addition on an elliptic curve [24] 
Point doubling is essentially the same operation as the point addition. In this case, we 
only have one point, but in this case the line is drawn as a tangent to that point. The 
result of the doubling is again the inverse of the intersection point.   
 
With these two operations, we can perform point multiplication. This is the main 
operation used in Elliptic curve cryptography. In point multiplication, a point P is 
multiplied with a scalar k to get a new point Q on the elliptic curve. This is where the 
discrete logarithm problem, and the security of ECC comes in. The discrete logarithm 
problem is in this case defined as the problem of finding k from the equation 𝑘𝑃 = 𝑄 
given P and Q. 
 
Point multiplication can be performed in various ways, but the simplest one is an 
algorithm called “double and add”. This method uses repeated point additions and 
doublings. Finding 𝑘𝑃 = 𝑄, where 𝑘 = 13, we first find the binary expansion of 13 which 
is 1101. Then the algorithm iterates through each digit and doubles for each digit and 
adds P if there is a 1.  
𝑄 = 𝑘 ∙ 𝑃 = 13 ∙ 𝑃 = 2(2(2𝑃 + 𝑃)) + 𝑃 
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While this example is using real numbers for sake of simplicity, elliptic curves in 
cryptography are defined over finite fields. The keys are generated by choosing a 
random number less than the order of the curve to be the private key d. The public key Q 
is a point on the curve, generated by multiplying the private key with a generating point. 
This gives the key pair (𝑑, 𝑄). With this, communicating nodes can perform 2 actions; key 
exchange (Elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange) and digital signing (Elliptic curve 
Digital Signing).  
 
The purpose of the key exchange is to agree on a common secret key, over an insecure 
channel. Each party performs point multiplication with his private key and the other 
party’s public key.  
 
A computes: 𝐴𝑘 = 𝑑𝑎 ∗ 𝑄𝑏 
B computes: 𝐵𝑘 = 𝑑𝑏 ∗ 𝑄𝑎 
 
Since the public keys are generated by a generating point G, we have: 
𝑑𝑎 ∗ 𝑄𝑏 =  𝑑𝑎 ∗  𝑑𝑏 ∗ 𝐺 =  𝑑𝑏 ∗  𝑑𝑎 ∗ 𝐺 =  𝑑𝑏 ∗ 𝑄𝑎 
 
This implies that 𝐴𝑘 =  𝐵𝑘. A and B now have the coordinates to a point on the curve that 
only they know, and this can be used as a secret key.  
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2.2 Symmetric algorithms 
In symmetric algorithms, the key used for encryption and decryption is the same. 
Therefore, it is necessary for the sender and receiver to obtain a common secret key 
which only they know about. This is often done by using the RSA or Diffie-Hellman key 
exchange. 
 
2.2.1 AES 
AES is a symmetric block cipher [25]. This algorithm has taken over after DES and Triple 
DES and become the default use for encryption of data. Today it is used in many 
protocols and application that offer encryptions, such as the SSL/TLS protocol [26].  Like 
mentioned above it is used to encrypt larger bulks of data to achieve confidentiality. AES 
encrypts blocks of 128 bits at a time, with keys of 128, 192 or 256 bits. Depending on the 
key length, AES performs encryption with 4-bit transformation in 10, 12 or 14 rounds. 
 
As of now, there has not been proven any attack that can break AES. Various attacks a 
have been demonstrated but none of them are threatening the use of AES as they are 
either to computationally demanding or not much faster than brute-force. Side-channel 
attacks like differential power analysis is possible [27]. But these do not target the 
mathematical properties of AES, but rather a weakness in the way it is implemented 
implementation.   
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Figure 6 - High-level structure of AES [28] 
 
The picture shows the operations done in decryption and encryption with AES. The 
encryption consists of 4 functions: AddRoundKey, SubBytes, ShiftRows and 
MixColumns. When encrypting the process starts with adding the round key. The 4 
functions are then done repeatedly for a number of times depending on the length of the 
key. The last of these rounds are then done without the MixColumns function, and the 
ciphertext is produced. Decryption is done the in the same way but with the inverse of 
the functions. A more detailed explanation of the functions follows below.  
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As a block cipher, AES operates on blocks of 128 bits at the time. These are structured 
in a matrix of 4x4 bytes. This matrix is called the state. Before the encryption starts, a 
key expansion is performed. Information on how this is performed can be found here 
[29]. 
 
2.2.1.1 AddRoundKey 
This is the first function of both encryption and decryption. Here, each of the 16 bytes of 
the state is XORed with 16 bytes of the expanded key. The first iteration uses bytes 1 – 
16 from the expansion key. The next time 17-32 is used, to never use the same byte 
twice.  
 
2.2.1.2 SubBytes 
The next step is to substitute each byte in the state with a corresponding value according 
to the following S-box lookup table. The values are shown in hexadecimal. One byte is 
represented by two hexadecimal digits. The new value is found by matching the first and 
second digit to the corresponding column and row.  
 
 
Table 1 - AES S-box lookup table [30] 
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2.2.1.3 ShiftRows 
This is where the matrix format of the state is important. In this function, each row is 
shifted to the left. The number of rotations to the left is determined by the row number. 
Row 0 is shifted 0 times to the left (stays the same). Row 1 is shifted 1 position to the 
left, and so on. To illustrate this an example of a state with values 1 – 16 would look like 
this before and after ShiftRows. 
 
Before 
1 2 3 4 
 5 6 7 8 
9 10 11 12 
13 14 15 16 
 
 
After 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2.1.4 MixColumn 
In the mix column function, the state matrix is multiplied with a matrix with values from 1 
to 3 as seen below. This matrix is a representation of a polynomial 𝑎(𝑥)  =  {03}𝑥3  +
 {01}𝑥2  +  {01}𝑥 +  {02}. The result gives a new matrix r, which is the new state after the 
MixColumns.  
 
1 2 3 4 
6 7 8 5 
11 12 9 10 
16 13 14 15 
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(
𝑠1 𝑠5 𝑠9 𝑠13
𝑠2 𝑠6 𝑠10 𝑠14
𝑠3 𝑠7 𝑠11 𝑠15
𝑠4 𝑠8 𝑠12 𝑠16
) ∗  (
2 3 1 1
1 2 3 1
1 1 2 3
3 1 1 2
) =  (
𝑟1 𝑟5 𝑟9 𝑟13
𝑟2 𝑟6 𝑟10 𝑟14
𝑟3 𝑟7 𝑟11 𝑟15
𝑟4 𝑟8 𝑟12 𝑟16
) 
Equations 3 - MixColumns operation example 
 
The operation is matrix multiplication, where the sum of the products in the first column 
and row form the first value in the result. The first operation would look like this: 
 
(𝑠1 ∗ 2) + (𝑠2 ∗ 3) + (𝑠3 ∗ 1) + (𝑠4 ∗ 1) =  𝑟1 
Equations 4 - MixColumns operation, first value of the new state 
 
To make the algorithm easier for hardware implementation, operations are done over the 
finite field 𝐺𝐹(28). The values are converted to an 8-bit binary representation. There are 
then 3 multiplications to define. Multiplication by 1 is the same. Multiplication by 2 can be 
done by shifting the number to the left. If the leftmost bit is 1 before shifting, we get an 
overflow and must reduce it by the modulo of the field.  
 
𝐴416  =  1010 01002 
1010 0100 ≪ 1 = 0100 1000 
0100 1000 ⊕ 0001 1011 = 0101 0011   
 
The example shows multiplication with 2 where the leftmost bit is one. The result of the 
shift is then XORed with 1𝐵16, where 1B is the hexadecimal representation of the 
irreducible polynomial of the field. 
 
To multiply with 3, we use the same method. Then we XOR the result with the original 
value because 3 = 2 ⊕ 1. So we have: 
 
3 ∗ 𝑥 = (2 ⊕ 1) ∗ 𝑥 = (2 ∗ 𝑥) ⊕ 𝑥 
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Now that the multiplication is defined, the addition in Equations 4 must be done. Since 
the operations are performed over 𝐺𝐹(28), addition is done by XOR. This equation gives 
the result for one of the values in the result matrix. The operation must then be done 15 
more times. The following iterations perform the operation on column 2 - row 1, column 3 
– row 1, and so on.  
 
2.2.1.5 Last round 
The last round is done the same as the others with the exception that MixColumns is not 
performed in this round. It is believed that the MixColumns in the last round does not 
have any effect on the security of the cipher, and is therefore not used. Some studies do 
however show that the absence of the last MixColumns reduce the time complexity of 
known attacks against the cipher [31]. 
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2.2.2 PRESENT 
PRESENT is another block cipher like AES, but this one is design to be used with limited 
computational power available [32]. Thus, it is considered an ultra-lightweight algorithm. 
It is based on the AES and has very similar operations. PRESENT was standardized by 
ISO/IEC in 2012 as “block ciphers suitable for lightweight cryptography, which are 
tailored for implementation in constrained environments”. PRESENT takes 64 bit blocks 
of data as input and encrypts with keys of 80, or 128 bits.  
 
 
PRESENT encryption has 31 rounds where each round consists of 3 parts.  The 
functions are addRoundKey, S-box modification and permutation of data. Like AES, 
PRESENT also operates with a state, which is the values of the data at any given time 
during the operation.  
 
2.2.2.1 addRoundKey  
AddRoundKey is done in the same way as with AES. The state is XORed bit by bit with 
the round key.   
 
2.2.2.2 S-Box 
For the S-Box, the state is divided into 16 4-bit words. These are then substituted 
according to the following table. Values in the table are shown in hexadecimal.  
 
 
Table 2 - PRESENT S-Box 
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2.2.2.3 Permutation 
In this function the state is permutated bit by bit. The permutation the PRESENT uses is 
given by the following table: 
 
 
Table 3 - PRESENT permutation table 
Each bit 𝑖 of the state is moved to another position according to the value given in P(i) . A 
visual representation of the whole substitution-permutation network looks like this: 
 
 
 
Figure 7 - SPN PRESENT 
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2.3 Architecture 
The structure model of an IoT solution determines how the nodes in the network are 
connected to each other. There are of course many ways to do this, but this report will 
differentiate on two different ways; a centralized, and a decentralized model. In many 
systems there could be a combination of the two solutions. Where user devices are 
communicating with a common (centralized) server to request information, but this server 
has its databases spread out in different (decentralized) locations. In this report, we will 
distinguish the two, by how the IoT devices are communicating with each other. Are they 
connected and communicate via a centralized server over the internet, or do they build 
up a network of interconnected IoT devices themselves?  
 
2.3.1 Centralized 
A centralized, or server-client structure consists of central infrasturcture nodes with which 
each of the end nodes communicate. The server side can consist of a single instance 
that handles a small amount of devices, to large data centers with millions of clients. The 
use-case in the security assumption chapter, is a typical example of a centralized 
architecture in IoT for home automation. The IoT devices are connected over the internet 
to application hosted by some company.  
 
The centralized architecture, which has been used for years with regular computers, 
clearly has its benefits. The networks are easy to manage and visualize as the 
connections between the communicating nodes are usually static. In this model most of 
the computation and processing is typically done on the server side. which relieves the 
end nodes of a lot of work. Smaller nodes can just gather and transmit data, which is 
handled on the server side.  
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In terms of IoT for smart homes this would mean that the IoT devices are connected to 
and managed by an infrastructure device. This could be a gateway such as shown in this 
system proposed by Freddy K. Santoso, and Nicholas C. H. Vun [11].   
 
 
Figure 8 - Model of proposed architecture in [11] 
By connecting devices like so, it creates a single point of contact for the user to manage 
all his devices.  
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2.3.2 Decentralized 
A decentralized system, or a peer-to-peer system, has a flat hierarchy. The nodes in 
such a network communicate with each other directly rather than having all 
communication go through some infrastructure devices. The work load and storage can 
also be distributed between the devices themselves. A way of distributing the stored data 
is by using a distributed hash table. The nodes in the network store some part of the data 
each. The hash table functions as a lookup table where, data is stored in (key, value) 
pairs. Where nodes can request a hashed filename, or key, and the nodes that is 
responsible will reply with the corresponding data.  
 
Similar to what the model shown for the centralized structure, a hybrid model consists of 
a decentralized network between the devices and with a stronger node acting as a 
gateway to the internet.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9 - P2P hybrid model 
Internet 
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3 Analysis 
The purpose of this report is to analyse the different solutions available for securing 
home automation systems. The different solutions that have been highlighted in this 
report, will be compared to each other to find the ones that are best suited for the given 
case. To do this we divide them into three categories based on what problem they are 
handling. The problems we will examine in this report are PKI, encryption and 
architecture. These are important parts for securing the communication network in a 
home automation system. Public key infrastructure provides authentication for the nodes 
in the network. Encryption algorithms like AES ensure privacy of the users. And the 
architecture determines how the network is structured and managed.   
 
3.1.1 PKI 
Public key infrastructure allows users to exchange keys and verify the identity of 
correspondents. These are two very important tasks to maintain the integrity of the 
communication. We must know that the data is coming from a legitimate source. This is 
usually obtained by digital signing. Also, since encryption of data is usually performed 
with a symmetric algorithm; we need a method to obtain a common secret key for both 
parties.  
 
RSA has for a long time been the default algorithm used to perform tasks like these. 
However, RSA has been proven to be too demanding for smaller devices to run 
efficiently. In recent years, Elliptic curve cryptography has gained some attention. 
Although the algorithm is not new, RSA still was the first to emerge. This could be the 
reason why RSA has become the most used option.  
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When looking at how secure an algorithm is we review it with “bits of security”. This is a 
notion that combines the specifications of the algorithm and the used key length. This 
determines a level of security to compare algorithms with varying key sizes. AES with 
128-bit key length offers 128 bits of security. To achieve this level of security with ECC 
and RSA we need key sizes of 256 and 3072 bits respectively [33]. The following table 
shows the comparison of the key sizes for RSA and ECC. The key sizes are also 
matched with the equivalent level of security symmetric key size.  
 
 
Table 4 - RSA vs. ECC key size 
 
With this we see that the RSA requires a lot larger key to achieve the same level of 
security. This is, and will continue to be a problem for smaller devices with limited 
storage and computational power. On devices that are not limited by this, ECC will have 
the benefit of being much faster than RSA. Smaller keys will greatly improve the speed of 
signing, handshake etc. In fact, RSA is generally estimated to be 10 times slower than 
ECC with 128 bits of security levels and around 50 – 100 on 256 bits [34].  
 
As shown in the description of the solutions in chapter 0, the mathematics behind ECC is 
a little more complicated than with the RSA. Although they have a lot of similarities, the 
operations can seems a bit confusing. There are also some parameters that has to be 
set, such as the choice of underlying field and basis, as well as the parameters for the 
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curve. Without proper knowledge, this can be a difficult task, and can result in insufficient 
security.  Choosing the wrong parameters can result in the curve being supersingular. 
This results in the curve being susceptible to attacks like the MOV attack [35]. NIST has 
made a collection of elliptic curves and parameters [36]. This collection contains 
description and suggested values for all parameters that are used for defining elliptic 
curves for cryptographic uses.  
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3.1.2 Encryption 
While RSA and ECC can be used for encryption, longer streams of data would be to 
exhausting. Therefor symmetric key algorithms are usually used instead. Given that first, 
a shared secret key is obtained, they are able to encrypt at a much faster rate. For some 
time, AES has been the standard algorithm for this. In IoT we need an algorithm that can 
handle encryption of data even with very limited hardware in a reasonable time. 
PRESENT was standardized in 2012 to satisfy the need for a lightweight crypto 
algorithm.  
 
As PRESENT is specifically designed to be ultra-lightweight, we can assume that it will 
require minimal resources. In this paper [37], AES and PRESENT are compared when 
implemented on a low cost smart phone.  In this analysis, we see that that AES 
outshines PRESENT in almost all categories in the results. Because PRESENT is 
developed for very constrained environments like RFID tags and contactless chips, an 
analysis on this kind of devices would provide different results.  
 
Another, more thorough research shows similar results [38]. The conclusion is here that 
the lightweight algorithms do have their benefits when run on restricted hardware 
compared to AES. But the differences are mostly not enough to justify implementing 
anything else than AES.  
 
Another thing to take note of when comparing the different algorithms is the security. The 
algorithm has to provide sufficient level of security if it is to be considered. A report 
published by the Czech Technical University evaluated PRESENT’s resistance to brute 
force attacks [39]. The results show that their high performance, code breaking machine 
was able to verify 24 billion keys per second. Even with this high performance machine a 
brute force attack was estimated to last on average 800 thousand years.  
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From this we see that in most cases AES is not too demanding of the hardware and only 
in devices with very limited computational power will the benefits of PRESENT start to 
show. Taken into account that AES is more secure than PRESENT, we can says with 
certainty that AES will in almost any case be a better option for the given setup we 
assumed in this report.   
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3.1.3 Architecture 
Today’s smart homes need a system to manage the communication between the IoT. 
This system must handle frequent off- and on boarding of devices. It must also provide a 
secure communication between a variety of devices, in a smaller network. To determine 
how the network in a smart home is best structured we will look at some pros and cons 
of the two different models. In the centralized model computing and data storage will 
typically be on the server side. Services like data storage and management will then be 
hosted by a vendor. In the decentralized or peer-to-peer model, communication will be 
between nodes.  
 
Centralized system 
o Pros 
▪ Central system for control and management of nodes 
▪ Storing data in one place makes it easier to back up 
o Cons 
▪ More expensive equipment needed for handling more devices 
▪ Single point of failure 
Decentralized system 
o Pros 
▪ Does not rely on a corporate server for functionality 
▪ User is in control of data and resources 
▪ Can scale without need of expensive equipment 
▪ Easy on-boarding of devices 
o Cons 
▪ Infected clients can more easily harm the whole network [40] 
▪ Lack of overview on where data is stored 
 
As we can see both systems have their advantages and disadvantages. But what is 
more important for the future of IoT? With the rate of increase we are seeing in the 
number of devices, scalability clearly is needed. And confidentiality and availability are 
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highly valued by the end user for any service. Seeing as a peer-to-peer network 
becomes stronger with increasing number of devices, this is a great way to handle an 
increasing number of devices.  
 
Client-server systems require infrastructure that can handle all the nodes in the network. 
Such infrastructure devices can be quite exensive, and with the rapid increase of number 
of devices the network needs to be scaleable.  
 
P2P avoids the danger of having services hosted on a server, in case the server should 
become unavailable for some reason. Typical scenarios where this could happen are 
when the devices communicate with a cloud-based application or data storage. If there is 
a problem on the server side or with your infrastructure devices, this service becomes 
unavailable for all devices. In case of a DDoS attack, a centralized system will be 
unavailable for all nodes that rely on this server. A P2P network will be a lot harder to 
take down. This is because in practice the attackers would have to target every device in 
the network to have the same effect. As a result, attackers would most likely never even 
try to perform a DDoS attack on such a network seeing as it would be too costly. 
Confidentiality can be achieved in both cases, but again the centralized system could 
possibly lose huge amounts of sensitive data if there is a breach in the central database.  
 
With the server-client approach all communication between the devices pass through the 
servers. These cloud servers have to handle massive amount of data coming in from all 
the IoT devices. Even the devices that are located in the same household would have to 
connect over the internet and via the server farms to communicate.  
 
You could argue that data storage and other services provided by third parties usually 
are secure enough. And that a security breach rarely happened and such services have 
almost 100% uptime. But in the event of an incident, the results are much worse than if a 
part of your P2P network becomes unavailable. If a node for some reason falls out, the 
rest of the network simply just works around it.   
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Recently there have been events that raise concerns about the usage of P2P networks 
for IoT. In 2016 it was uncovered that security cameras and other devices from Foscam, 
A Chinese manufacturer, was communicating secretly over the a P2P network hosted by 
the company [41]. When it became known that this communication was not possible to 
turn off, many security researchers and users alike became quite worried. Foscam later 
revealed that the purpose of this communication was heartbeat monitoring, to check the 
connectivity and that no personal data was stored on the company servers. The fact that 
the devices communicated with the manufacturer without the users knowing left many 
with a concern about the usage of P2P networks. 
 
Decentralization will solve many of the problems that IoT currently face, but it will also 
introduce some new ones. Since there is such variation in performance of IoT devices, 
the ability to handle a decentralized model can vary. Both encryption and storage will 
become a problem for smaller devices with limited storage and computational power. 
Decentralized models such as blockchain removes the central storage servers. The 
nodes in the network are themselves responsible for the storage. The chain of 
information will increase over time, which in turn will become a problem for the smaller 
devices.   
  
Streembit is a good example on how to handle IoT by use of a decentralized 
architecture. By not using the standard centralized architecture; Streembit is developed 
to overcome the problems these systems have with scalability and also becomes more 
scalable as more devices are added. The nodes are connected in a peer-to-peer 
network. On-boarding and distribution of data is provided by use of a distributed hash 
table called Kademlia. Data is stored in (key, value) pairs the value can then be retrieved 
by using this key. The Kademlia distributed hash table is already used in various other 
settings.  In file-sharing networks the BitTorrent protocol is using the Kademlia DHT with 
great success.  
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Figure 10 - Streembit architecture [42] 
 
The nodes communicate directly with each other in a peer-to-peer network. 
Communication is secured by using Elliptic curve for key exchange (ECDH) and digital 
signing (ECDSA), and AES for data encryption. To further secure the communication 
between the nodes of the network, Streembit supports the option the make private 
networks. This allows the nodes to only communicate with your trusted devices within 
your home. On-boarding devices are connected to the public Streembit network to 
publish their encrypted IP address. They are then disconnected to await connection from 
the other private network participants.  
 
Another approach to a peer-to-peer architecture of IoT, is the Blockchain solution. IBM 
and Samsung have been collaborating with Blockchain to develop an IoT solution called 
ADEPT that utilize the advantages of using a decentralized architecture like Blockchain 
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[43]. Blockchain is the same technology that Bitcoin uses. The idea is to use this 
technology to let devices establish a network, where they can publish data, much like 
how transactions are published to the chain in Bitcoin. With this shared information, other 
devices can act accordingly. Security cameras, sensors, locks, and alarm are all devices 
that communicates with each other in a smart home environment. With Blockchain such 
devices will be able to share their data without going through a server outside of the 
home network.   
 
When storing the data in a blockchain, like ADPET does, there occurs a problem with 
storage for smaller devices. As time passes, there will be a lot of information to handle, 
and with the flat hierarchy of a peer-to-peer network, devices that have limited storage 
capacity will be congested with unnecessary information. ADEPT solves this by 
categorizing the peers of the network in 3 types: Light peer, standard peer and peer 
exchange [43]. These categories represent how powerful the device is and what should 
be its responsibilities.  
 
The light peers are devices such as smart light bulbs which have limited storage and 
memory. These should only perform massaging and minimal storage of the distributed 
data. More demanding actions will be assigned to a more powerful trusted peer.  
 
The standard peer is other IoT devices that have more powerful hardware and can store 
data and perform actions for themselves as well as the light peers. These devices will 
also forward messages for other devices. This will be quite demanding in terms of 
computational power for such devices. But IBM believes that with the current rate of 
development we will see devices capable of this as a standard in the near future.  
 
The last category is the peer exchanges. Peer exchanges are powerful devices operated 
by companies essentially replacing the centralized servers that host cloud storage and 
application now. These can not only store a complete copy of a blockchain, but also host 
services that tie the consumer to a “marketplace”. These “marketplaces” are IBMs 
envisions of connections from a device to a vendor. With this, a washing machine can 
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order and pay for new detergent when it runs empty, with only machine-to-machine 
communication as demonstrated by IBM [43]. The categories also determine the trust 
level of the devices. Where light peers like smart watches and other wearables should 
not be able to make order or make any changes for other devices unless specifically 
noted.  
 
Solutions like Blockchain and Streembit are still in development, and it could take years 
before we see a fully decentralized system be commercially available for home 
automation. 
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4 Discussion 
From the literature review we can see that there is room for some improvements in the 
field of IoT. What is most important is to not to determine whether improvements must be 
made by the manufacturers or education of the end users. The answer is both. IoT 
devices must not be view as insignificant small devices that face no great threat to the 
web. Manufacturers should both enable devices and require users to make use of 
security measures.  
 
As the comparison show, a decentralized architecture with ECC for PKI and AES for 
encryption is the preferred way to go. Elliptic curve cryptography shows better 
performance in all cases when applied in restricted environments and should be used as 
a standard way of implementing public key infrastructure in home automation systems as 
well as other fields of IoT. RSA is the most used solution, but as there is a need for a 
lighter algorithm, more and more systems are starting to use ECC.  The fact that the 
math behind it is easier to understand, should not hinder the drive to implement better 
solutions. ECC is able to provide the same level of security with a shorter key length. For 
devices with limited computational power, this is a huge benefit.  
 
In a smart home like the one modelled in the use-case, devices that have extreme 
limitation in computational power are rare. Even light bulbs like the LIFX smart lightbulb 
are able to use AES. An exploit which made an attacker able to obtain the WIFI 
password was discovered in 2014, but this was because the pre-shared keys never 
changed, not because of the AES implementation [44]. AES is the standard block cipher 
for many protocols and security suites. And given the marginal benefits that PRESENT 
shows in smaller semi-restricted devices, there is little that suggests there is a need to 
change that. AES performs well in all but the most extreme cases, such as RFID 
sensors. The benefits of PRESENT do not outweigh the fact that on such devices as in 
the use-case, AES performs better and provides more security. The continuation of using 
AES as a standard for home automation systems is therefore suggested. 
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As for the architecture, the centralized model is the most well-known and mature option. 
Because of the way it is structured, it is easier to both visualize and manage. But with the 
rate of increase in number of devices, a peer-to-peer architecture is the best suited 
solution when considering the future of IoT. Having a device accessible from the internet 
can be useful, but the real power in home automation is the cooperation of the devices 
themselves. As devices are added to a smart home, it enables cooperation between the 
devices without human intervention. Such as security systems with cameras, lock ad 
alarms. This kind of M2M communication within your home should be directly between 
the devices. A peer-to-peer architecture also provides the added security against DDoS 
attacks. While a home network is not really a high value target for such an attack, the 
peer-to-peer structure makes it much more robust against a DDoS attack. This kind of 
attack is more likely to target larger companies, and as the P2P option is less reliant on 
communication going via external parties, it is less likely to be affected by this kind of 
attack.  
 
Blockchain is one of the solutions to create P2P networks in IoT. When using blockchain 
at the current state, a fully decentralized network is not the most efficient. Smaller 
devices will likely encounter storage problems. With solutions like this, the chain will 
eventually become quite large as it is storing all transactions that are being made. With 
devices of variable sizes, a solution where the stronger devices handle more of the 
storage and communication, would be more efficient. ADEPT by IBM fixes this problem 
by distributing the workload and storage to more powerful devices. The only problem is 
that this solution requires devices powerful enough to be used as standard peers, and 
handle some of the tasks of the light peers. According to IBM, such hardware capabilities 
will be standard in a few years. But as of now a smart home like the one in our use-case 
would consist of only light peers, which defeats the purpose of implementing such a 
model.  
 
A way to to work around this problem is to add a device that handles the distributed hash 
table. In short term this works against the idea of decentralization, but it solves the 
problem with hardware limitations in a way that prepares for the future. The smaller 
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devices would not be overloaded with information that they don’t need. This solution can 
utilize the benefits of decentralization, with the minus of having a single point of failure at 
the devices that handles the hash table. But in contrast to a centralized architecture, the 
failure point is in your home and in your control. As IoT devices with more computational 
power enters the market these will then be able to function as standard peers, and 
contribute along with the device. Then, the purpose of the device will shift from handling 
the workload of all your devices, to adding stability to your network. With a more powerful 
device in place, other, more demanding security measures could be implemented as 
well. With behaviour analysis, the peers could be monitored for signs of infection or 
malicious activity based on their behaviour.  
 
The Streembit solution handles the problem of low power devices in a similar, but more 
realistic way. The developer acknowledges that in its current state, blockchain operation 
are simply too demanding for most IoT devices. Since the distributed hash table Kadmlia, 
is not storing every transaction like the with blockchain, it is much less demanding. In 
Streembit, low power devices are excluded from actions that are not relevant to them by 
a gateway [45]. A garage door opener does not need to take part in routing and other 
such actions.  
 
For security Streembit is also able to establish private network where only authorised 
accounts and devices are able to connect. This, combined with the fact that it utilizes 
security measures like AES and ECC to provide integrity and confidentiality, provides the 
network and its devices with strong security against Sybil attacks and other malicious 
activities.  
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In other words, Streembit fulfils the requirement for ensure Availablility, confidentiality 
and intergretiy for users and devices in the network. It also implements features 
corresponding to the answers of the questions in the problem statement.  
 
- Is Elliptic Curve Cryptography more suitable for smart home devices than RSA?  
o From the research covered in this report ECC is concluded to be the best 
suited option for smart homes 
- Should the ultra-lightweight encryption algorithm PRESENT replace AES in such 
a setting? 
o Given that the type of devices commonly used in smart homes are able to 
run AES efficiently, there is no need to change it for PRESENT. 
- Which type of network architecture is best suited for the future of IoT? Centralized 
client-server, or decentralized peer-to-peer? 
o Peer-to-Peer seems to be the architecture that is best suited for the future 
of IoT. While most of the solutions for this is still in development they show 
great promise.  
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5 Conclusion 
A literature review of the current situation in the field of IoT. Based on this an analysis of 
possible solution has been done to find and propose the security measures that are best 
suited for public key infrastructure, data encryption and network architecture in smart 
homes. As a result of the reviewed literature in this report, a decentralized peer-to-peer 
communication network that uses AES and ECC, is suggested as a set of solutions best 
suited for home automation. These solutions alone are by no means a fix to the many 
problems that IoT face, but based on what is shown in this report this is the way to go for 
further improvement of the security of smart homes. The Streembit system implements 
the suggested security measures, and based on the analysis this is suggested as the 
way forward for improving IoT and home automation.  
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6 Further work 
Securing network is a continuous process. New vulnerabilities and exploits will emerge 
and new ways of handling them must be found. While IoT and home automation has 
been around for a while, it is still an emerging technology. There is a lot of development 
driven in different directions to find the best solutions. With systems like Streembit and 
ADEPT, we see a shift from the server-client model towards decentralization and peer-
to-peer networks. These systems are still in the development phase, but they show great 
promise. This report suggested the Streembit solution as the best way forward. A 
possible improvement for the Streembit system would be to implement a system like 
ADEPT, where the nodes are categorized based on the computational power. This 
relieves the low power nodes of a lot of work. 
 
With the future in mind, other aspects of securing home automation should be analysed 
as well. This report covers some of the vital aspects for securing network 
communication. But for a well-functioning system other topics and other layers, like the 
application layer should see some improvements. Stricter policies for changing and 
strength of passwords and methods for rolling out security updates for all devices in your 
home network are things that definitely could be useful for home automation. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A       Glossary and Abbreviations 
ECC   Elliptic Curve Cryptography 
RSA Cryptosystem designed by Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard 
Adleman 
AES   Advanced Encryption Standard 
LLN   Low-Power and Lossy Networks 
6lowPAN  IPv6 over Low-power Wireless Personal Area Networks 
PKI   Public key infrastructure 
MITM   Man in the middle 
ECCDSA  Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm 
ECCDH  Elliptic curve Diffie–Hellman 
IoT   Internet of Things 
P2P   Peer-to-Peer 
M2M   Machine-to-Machine 
H2M   Human-to-Machine 
RFID   Radio Frequency Identification 
IP   Internet Protocol 
SPN   Radio Frequency Identification 
 
